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Civil Settlement During Rape Prosecutions
William H.J. Hubbardt
[E]ither a guilty man bought his way out of a trial or an in-
nocent man was wrongly accused in a successful extortion
attempt.1
A defendant in a criminal rape prosecution faces the prospect
of a civil action brought by the complainant.2 Sometimes, the de-
fendant will offer to settle the potential civil case with the com-
plainant while the prosecution is still pending. Following settle-
ment, the complainant may request that the charges be dropped
or refuse to cooperate with the prosecution.
A prosecution for a robbery or an assault still could proceed
without the cooperation of the alleged victim, relying instead on
other witnesses and physical evidence. But a rape prosecution is
different. A rape prosecution almost always relies heavily on the
complainant's testimony. If the complainant is no longer inter-
ested in pursuing the case, even the most zealous prosecutor may
have little choice but to drop the charges.3 Regardless of how the
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' Debra Saunders, Uneven Scales Tilt the Crime Bill, Times-Picayune B5 (Feb 7,
1994) (criticizing government tolerance of civil settlements that lead to dropped criminal
charges). Consider the following account:
[A woman accused a man of raping her at a cocktail party.] The man denied the
charges, but after the woman hired a civil lawyer known for winning big settlements
in such cases, the man told his attorney to offer the woman money. The attorney con-
tacted the woman's civil lawyer and offered to pay $850,000 for her alleged pain and
suffering, but the offer would only be good if the criminal case was resolved in the de-
fendanes favor .... [Tihe woman decided not to testify and the case was dismissed.
She took her $850,000 and moved to the Caribbean.
Tobia Smith and Bob Edwards, Paying Off on Sex Crimes, National Public Radio Morning
Edition (Apr 21, 1998) (Smith, reporter, recounting story told to NPR by a lawyer).
2 Because the settlements that are the subject of this Comment occur before the
criminal trial, this Comment uses the term "complainant" rather than "victim" when dis-
cussing cases where the fact of the rape is in dispute.
See Jeanne C. Marsh, Alison Geist and Nathan Caplan, Rape and the Limits of Law
Reform 88 (Auburn House 1982) ("In Detroit, analysis of the Sex Crimes Unit data reveals
that virtually half of the [sex offense] cases dismissed are accounted for by the complain-
ant's refusal to prosecute or appear at trial."). See also Smith and Edwards, Paying Off on
Sex Crimes, National Public Radio Morning Edition (cited in note 1) (quoting Wendy Mur-
phy, former prosecutor: "In terms of intimate violence, there tend to be only two witnesses,
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alleged rapist and the alleged victim reached their settlement,
one fewer rape prosecution will go forward.
Because the rape victim's testimony is central to the success
of a rape prosecution, pretrial settlement4 in rape cases can un-
dermine the enforcement of rape law. A guilty defendant can use
pretrial settlement to influence the complainant not to cooperate
with the prosecution. Pretrial settlement also offers an opportu-
nity for a false accuser to extort a payment from an innocent de-
fendant before a trial exonerates the accused.
Rape law enforcement is a pressing concern. Estimates of the
incidence of rape vary widely, but even relatively conservative es-
timates indicate hundreds of thousands of rapes per year,5 sug-
gesting that millions or tens of millions of women have been vic-
tims of rape or attempted rape. Other estimates provide even
more mind-boggling numbers.6 Further, even women never vic-
timized by rape may experience rape as an ever-present danger.'
one of whom is accused of the crime and has a Fifth Amendment right not to testify. The
other one, the woman, typically, makes or breaks the case. If she doesn't testify, there's
usually no evidence left over.").
' In this Comment, "pretrial settlement" refers to a payment from the defendant to
the complainant ostensibly made to settle any civil claims arising from the alleged rape.
Such payments are made while the criminal prosecution is still pending.
' The Department of Justice has estimated 130,000 rapes per year. National Victim
Center and Crime Victims Research and Treatment Center (National Victim Center"),
Rape in America: A Report to the Nation 3 (Apr 23, 1992).
6 Id at 2 (reporting that one out of every eight women surveyed was a victim of rape
at some point in her lifetime); Virginia State Council of Higher Education and the Task
Force on Campus Rape ("Task Force on Campus Rape"), Sexual Assault on Virginia's
Campuses 17-18 (Virginia Senate 1992) (finding that 5 percent of women students at Vir-
ginia college campuses were victims of attempted rape, which is consistent with data on
rape covering college campuses nationwide); Mary P. Koss, Christine A. Gidycz and Nad-
ine Wisniewski, The Scope of Rape: Incidence and Prevalence of Sexual Aggression and
Victimization in a National Sample of Higher Education Students, 55 J Consulting &
Clinical Psych 162, 168 (1987) (reporting that "since the age of fourteen, 27% of college
women reported experiencing an act that met the legal definition of rape, which includes
attempt"). However, it should be noted that estimating the incidence of rape is very diffi-
cult. Lorraine Dusky, Still UnequaL" The Shameful Truth About Women and Justice in
America 380 (Crown 1996) (stating that "[r]ape statistics have always been ambiguous be-
cause of the difficulty in collecting them"); Task Force on Campus Rape, Sexual Assault on
Virginia's Campuses at 27 ('Because of the underreporting and the overlap in the statis-
tics kept by various agencies, the number of actual incidents is virtually impossible to de-
termine on the basis of official crime statistics."); Margaret T. Gordon and Stephanie
Riger, The Female Fear 35 (Free Press 1989) (discussing discrepancies in statistics and
noting that "[p]erhaps the greatest source of error in the reported rate of rape is the non-
reported incidents"). Changes in the wording of a question can transform the results.
Dusky, Still Unequal at 380 (citing National Victim Center, Rape in America (cited in note
5) and acknowledging that use of the word "rape," rather than a description of forced sex,
results in "the number of positive responses go[ing] down by about half").
' Gordon and Riger, The Female Fear at 2 (cited in note 6) ('Most women experience
fear of rape as a nagging, gnawing sense that something awful could happen ....
Women's fear of rape is a sense that one must always be on guard."). Evidence indicates
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Unfortunately, effective rape law enforcement is a delicate
and exceedingly difficult matter. Few victims report that they
have been raped,8 and those that do may be reluctant to testify or
participate in criminal discovery.' A rape victim may desire jus-
tice, but ultimately she may accept an offer of payment in order
to avoid the trauma of continuing investigation and possible trial.
Hopefully, the victim achieves closure. But the cost to society is
high. If criminal sanctions are not pursued, their ability to pre-
vent future crimes through incapacitation is lost. Pretrial settle-
ments in the rape context dilute the deterrent value of settlement
because the victim's desire to avoid trial weakens her bargaining
position. Pretrial settlement may cause prosecutors to lose confi-
dence that rape victims will see their cases through. Perhaps
most troubling, settlement perpetuates the extremely low rates of
conviction for rape,10 giving credence to the myths that rape is not
common and rape complainants are not credible.
Because there are few cases involving pretrial settlement
during rape prosecutions,1 it is not clear whether courts would
apply bribery and witness tampering laws to pretrial settlements
that induce rape complainants to avoid trial. Although such laws
are broadly drafted and usually broadly construed, courts may be
reluctant to entertain prosecutions based on civil settlements.
This Comment argues that courts should scrutinize pretrial set-
that a rapist is more likely to be a nonstranger-for example, a date-than a stranger.
See, for example, National Victim Center, Rape in America at 4 (cited in note 5) (finding
that only 22 percent of rape victims are raped by strangers). The prevalence of date rape
forces women to be on guard even in intimate social situations.
' National Victim Center, Rape in America at 6 (cited in note 5) (citing National
Women's Study finding that 84 percent of rape victims do not report the rape); Task Force
on Campus Rape, Sexual Assault on Virginia's Campuses at 27 (cited in note 6) (noting
that "only 2-3 percent of victims report [the rape] to anyone in authority"); Candace Wal-
dron, et al, Sexual Assault in Massachusetts 1985-1987 Shattering the Myths 33 (Mass
Dept of Public Health 1990) (finding that only 40 percent of victims of completed rapes re-
ported the rape to the police).
' See Waldron, et al, Sexual Assault in Massachusetts at 42 (cited in note 8) (finding
that only 28 percent of sample intended to prosecute). See also Part I.B.
"0 Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair
Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 UC Davis L Rev 1013, 1024 (1991) (noting that estimates of
the percentage of convictions that follow rape vary from 1 to 4 percent); Marsh, Geist and
Caplan, Rape and the Limits of Law Reform at 31 (cited in note 3) (citing studies in three
jurisdictions that indicate 4 to 5 percent of rape arrests end in convictions); Dusky, Still
Unequal at 383 (cited in note 6) (citing a Portland, Oregon, study that found that only 2
percent of rapes end in imprisonment).
" Part II discusses the present law regulating the influencing of witnesses or victims.
See also Marsh, Geist and Caplan, Rape and the Limits of Law Reform at 85 (cited in note
3) ("Law primarily governs the conduct of the most visible aspect of a case, its culmination
in trial. But it leaves untouched many steps in case processing that are crucial to deter-
mining whether a case ever reaches the courtroom.").
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tlements in rape prosecutions for violations of statutes prohibit-
ing influence over victims and witnesses.12 Part I outlines the
ways that pretrial settlement in rape prosecutions can weaken
the enforcement of rape law. Part II surveys tampering statutes
and their application to cases involving situations like pretrial
settlement. Part III argues that courts should construe tampering
statutes to prohibit pretrial settlements intended to influence the
complainant to get the rape charges dropped. Such scrutiny
would conform to both the text and purposes of tampering stat-
utes. Part IV argues that this proposal would ameliorate the
harms of pretrial settlement.
I. THE EFFECTS OF PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT IN
RAPE PROSECUTIONS
Parties, even potential parties, to civil litigation are gener-
ally free to settle existing or potential claims. This freedom to set-
tle can yield many benefits: it alleviates the public and private
costs of civil trials, eliminates the uncertainty and delay of litiga-
tion, and allows parties, through contract, to craft the precise
remedies they desire. Settlement provides parties to a dispute the
maximum amount of autonomy in resolving their affairs.
Although settlement often benefits the parties involved,
when a defendant and a complainant in a rape prosecution settle
before the resolution of the criminal case their behavior should be
suspect. First, pretrial settlement allows a defendant to influence
the complainant's participation in the criminal prosecution. In
rape cases, the alleged victim and the star witness are the same
person; thus, by settling with the victim, a defendant can in effect
make payments to a witness in a rape trial. Because the victim
and the witness are the same person, the suspect nature of the
payments is masked. Second, pretrial settlement can occur in a
coercive context. For example, the defendant may be able to ex-
ploit the complainant's fear of a harrowing trial to achieve a fa-
vorable settlement. Third, pretrial settlement is a way for a false
accuser to use state resources to pressure the defendant, en-
abling her to extort money from an innocent defendant. Finally,
settlement imposes costs on society as a whole. It undermines the
expressive and deterrent effects of criminal sanctions and may
commodify rape.
2 This Comment refers to these laws collectively as "tampering statutes." See note 46.
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A. Influencing Complainants Not to Cooperate with
the Prosecution
Any civil settlement before a criminal trial, as a payment
from the defendant to the complainant, may be suspect because
many payments to witnesses and victims are illegal. In rape
cases, pretrial settlement is especially suspect because the poten-
tial civil plaintiff (the complainant) is also the linchpin to the
criminal trial. Explicitly or implicitly, the defendant may condi-
tion the payment on a favorable outcome in the criminal prosecu-
tion. Although the prosecutor controls whether a prosecution goes
forward, the complainant can ensure that the state will abandon
the prosecution by refusing to cooperate with the prosecution in
various ways: asking the prosecutor to drop the charges, failing to
appear at judicial proceedings, refusing to testify, or testifying fa-
vorably to the defendant. As Part III demonstrates, a settlement
intended to affect the complainant's participation in the prosecu-
tion violates tampering statutes.
Although case law provides several examples of payments
conditioned explicitly on complainant noncooperation with the
prosecution, 13 pretrial settlements can influence complainants in
much more subtle ways. 4 A civil settlement easily can be struc-
tured to ensure that the victim will try to keep the case from be-
ing prosecuted. For example, the value of the settlement could be
paid out over a period of years exceeding the statute of limita-
tions for the crime or the amount of the settlement payments
could be tied to the defendant's future earnings."
B. Coercive Nature of Pretrial Settlement
Fear of the trauma caused by participating in the rape prose-
cution and by testifying at trial may compel rape victims to settle
the civil case prior to the criminal trial and end all proceedings
against the defendant. 6 Rape complainants have powerful rea-
See Part II.B.
"As one attorney put it, defendants "settle the civil case and hope for the best, quote,
unquote." Susan D. Etkind, A Hazy, Hazardous Line, Conn L Trib (Oct 20, 1997).
" Legal Ethics: Can Settlement Buy Accuser's Silence?, Conn L Trib 12 (Feb 14, 1994)
(noting less obvious ways than explicit agreement for the defendant to prevent the victim
from testifying). If the settlement payments are tied to the defendant's future earnings,
the victim will have significant incentives to keep the defendant out of jail. Furthermore,
the plaintiff may feel that pursuing a prosecution may provoke the defendant to breach
the settlement agreement.
" See James E. Lobsenz, Prosecutorial Management of the Uncooperative Victim-
Witness, 15 Crim L Bull 301, 311-18 (July-Aug 1979) (finding that, in criminal trials, wit-
nesses are uncooperative because of "courtroom phobia," fear of retaliation, and the incon-
venience of trial; arguing that complainants in criminal prosecutions should be compelled
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sons for not wanting to testify at trial." Historically, defense at-
torneys subjected complainants to humiliating cross-
examination."8 Although rape shield laws now limit questions
about a complainant's sexual history,19 testifying about sexual
violence remains a traumatic experience for many women.2' Fur-
ther, a complainant may wish to avoid public exposure as a rape
victim.21 Painful public scrutiny and the stigma attached to being
a rape victim may provide sufficient incentive for a rape victim to
make a pretrial settlement in exchange for getting the charges
against the defendant dropped. Consequently, defendants can use
complainants' fear of stigma to pressure them to settle.
Postponing the possibility of settlement until after the crimi-
nal case goes to trial or is plea bargained will partially remedy
this problem of coercion. In addition, it will often benefit the vic-
tim: a conviction gives the complainant tremendous bargaining
leverage in a civil suit, because liability has been established. De-
spite this potential advantage, the complainant-fearful of a trial
to testify; but "conced[ing] that the case for nonprosecution because of a rape victim's de-
sire to avoid the painful experience of testifying in court is a very strong one").
"' Torrey, 24 UC Davis L Rev at 1030 (cited in note 10) C'Shame and fear are primary
considerations for many [rape victims].... [Tihe experience of a trial is grueling and fre-
quently provokes responses in the victim similar to those caused by the actual rape.").
" Stephen J. Schulhofer, Unwanted Sex: The Culture of Intimidation and the Failure
of the Law 28 (Harvard 1998) (listing questions about use of birth control, sexual activity,
adulterous affairs, even whether the complainant had ever been employed as a cocktail
waitress).
" FRE 412 is the federal rape shield statute. See also Schulhofer, Unwanted Sex at 30
(cited in note 18); Marsh, Geist and Caplan, Rape and the Limits of Law Reform at 68-69
(cited in note 3) (reporting a Michigan study indicating that rape law reform has made vic-
tims' experiences less traumatic).
' Rape shield laws are no guarantee that trial will not be an ordeal for the complain-
ant. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State 179-80 (Harvard
1989) ("Women who charge rape say they were raped twice, the second time in court. Un-
der a male state, the boundary violation, humiliation, and indignity of being a public sex-
ual spectacle makes this more than a figure of speech."). See also Dusky, Still Unequal at
389 (cited in note 6) (quoting Alan Dershowitz on the defense of William Kennedy Smith
for rape: "The strategy will be to make the woman sorry she ever brought the charges");
National Victim Center, Rape in America at 5 (cited in note 5) (reporting that 68 percent
of victims said they were somewhat or extremely concerned about others knowing they
had been raped, 50 percent were concerned about their name being made public, and 69
percent were concerned about being blamed by others); Evaluation/Policy Research Asso-
ciates, A Study of Rape and the Rape Victim for the Chicago-Cook County Criminal Justice
Commission 20 (Dec 19, 1977) ("[Some victims] are particularly concerned about how their
family and friends will react and even want to hide the event from the family .... Victims
may also be concerned about whether they can go through with the [investigatory] process
and be able to recount the facts.").
2 National Victim Center, Rape in America at 10 (cited in note 5) (reporting that 92
percent of rape victims in survey would be less likely to report a rope if they believed their
name would be disclosed to the media).
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and perhaps needled by subtle threats from the defendant 22-may
settle and forego the benefits of postponement.
C. Promotion of False Accusations
Historically, courts and legal scholars have been particularly
sensitive to fears of false accusations of rape." Courts feared that
women would allege rape out of spite or to conceal illicit liai-
sons.24 Some studies have found anecdotal accounts of false accu-
sations,25 but there is little empirical support for the proposition
that false accusations make up a substantial percentage of rape
complaints.26
Pretrial settlement may encourage false accusations of rape.
A complainant, motivated by spite or greed, may falsely accuse
the defendant of rape in order to extort a settlement from him.
A few cases lend support to the hypothesis that some rape com-
plaints are motivated by a scheme to extort money from an inno-
cent defendant. 8
' Consider the not-so-subtle threats by the defendant in Lichens v Superior Court, 181
Cal App 2d 573, 5 Cal Rptr 539, 541 (1960): if there was a trial, the victim's "sister's and
her mother's names would be dragged into the papers and [] a general 'stink' about the
whole thing would be stirred up."
' Schulhofer, Unwanted Sex at 17-29 (cited in note 18) (stating that one of the tradi-
tional concerns about rape prosecutions was the supposed ease with which false accusa-
tions of rape could be made); Matthew Hale, 1 History of the Pleas of the Crown 635 (1778)
(asserting that rape charges are "easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to
be defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent").
Marsh, Geist and Caplan, Rape and the Limits of Law Reform at 92 (cited in note 3)
(relating examples given by police officers of situations that give rise to false reports of
sexual assault: juveniles with truancy records who "mak[e] [up] rape report[s] to cover up
the real reason for [their] absence," "married women who are running around ... [who
cry] 'rape' when [their] husband[s] find[ ] out," and "young women who 'cry rape' when
parents discover them to be sexually active"); Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 388
(Harvard 1992) (mentioning reasons for false accusations, including to explain a preg-
nancy or to gain advantage in a divorce by claiming marital rape).
' See, for example, Marsh, Geist and Kaplan, Rape and the Limits of Law Reform at
92 (cited in note 3) (describing accounts by police officers).
See Dusky, Still Unequal at 383 (cited in note 6) ("We don't know with any certainty
what the number of false accusations are, or how many of those ever go to trial, but one
study from the Portland, Oregon, police puts the figure at 2 percent, less than false re-
ports for stolen vehicles."); Marsh, Geist and Kaplan, Rape and the Limits of Law Reform
at 86 (reporting a Michigan study finding that most police say that less than 10 percent of
rape reports are "unfounded").
' See generally Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process, 9 Harv
J L & Pub Pol 357, 362 (1986) (noting that the historical shift from private prosecutions to
state prosecutions was partly a response to "initiation of prosecutions for revenge and per-
sonal animosity").
' In United States v Reed, 715 F2d 870, 872 (5th Cir 1983) (per curiam), defendant
Burton accused Wolfe of raping her. Wolfe denied the accusation. Id. Defendant Reed con-
tacted Wolfe, saying that the alleged victim's "two big bad brothers in California' would
come ... and 'gee Wolfe, but that [ ] Reed could probably help Wolfe if Wolfe came up with
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A false accuser's ability to extort money from the defendant
is greatest before the criminal trial. The accuser can free-ride off
the investigative efforts of the state while using the threat of a
criminal trial as leverage against the defendant. The defendant
faces the prospect of two trials-criminal and civil-and the me-
dia coverage that often accompanies a criminal trial. Just as the
bona fide rape victim may feel coerced by the threat of stigma to
settle, the falsely accused rape defendant may feel compelled to
settle to avoid the stigma of a public trial.
D. Pretrial Settlements Conceal the Rape Problem
By punishing certain actions, the criminal law educates soci-
ety about what behavior is unacceptable." Every pretrial settle-
ment that results in charges being dropped conceals another
rapist from the public eye.3" Because pretrial settlement requires
money, wealthier defendants disproportionately may be able to
evade prosecution. Certain types of rapes-such as acquaintance
rapes by college students or professionals-will generally involve
wealthier defendants. Consequently, those types of rape will re-
ceive less prosecutorial attention, thereby perpetuating the myth
that the typical rapist is an indigent stranger.3
some money." Id. The court affirmed defendants' convictions for extortion of money from
the alleged rapist Wolfe "[a]lthough the defendants contend[ed] that they were pursuing
what they believed to be a legitimate civil settlement of Burton's claim against Wolfe." Id
at 874. In State v Finley, 300 SC 196, 387 SE2d 88 (1989), the South Carolina Supreme
Court reversed a defendant's conviction for sexual assault on the basis of improper eviden-
tiary rulings by the trial court. The court held that the trial court must admit impeach-
ment evidence that the alleged victim was trying to extort money from the defendant by
offering to drop the charges. 387 SE2d at 89-90.
See Johannes Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U Pa L
Rev 949, 949 (1966) ("By means of the criminal law... 'messages' are sent to members of
a society .... The decisions of the courts... transmit knowledge about the law... [se-
curing] a general preventive effect.").
' Very few rapists are subject to the visible public scrutiny of trial. Only a small frac-
tion of rapes end in conviction. See note 10. Further, most convictions are the product of
plea bargains. See note 128.
" Rape is most often visualized as an attack by a stranger. See Gordon and Riger, The
Female Fear at 25 (cited in note 6) ("Most women think most rapes are 'stranger' rapes.").
See also MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State at 181 (cited in note 20)
("[R]ape comes to mean a strange (read Black) man who does not know his victim but does
know she does not want sex with him, going ahead anyway."). In reality, however, most
rapes are committed by men known to their victims. National Victim Center, Rape in
America at 4 (cited in note 5) (finding only 22 percent of all rape victims surveyed were as-
saulted by strangers); Waldron, et al, Sexual Assault in Massachusetts at 10 (cited in note
8) (reporting that 18 percent of surveyed victims were raped by a stranger); MacKinnon,
Toward a Feminist Theory of the State at 176 ("Women... are most often raped by men
whom they know.") (citing studies).
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By concealing cases of acquaintance rape, pretrial settlement
perpetuates societal misperceptions of the incidence of rape. Two
consequences follow. First, victims of acquaintance rape may feel
alienated and hopeless because their experience appears unusual
and is not criminally punished." This, in turn, reduces reporting
of rapes, perpetuating societal misperception of the incidence of
rape.33 Second, many men who do not commit rape in the arche-
typal fashion may not realize that they are committing a crime.'
E. Deterrence of Rape
Civil settlement undermines the criminal law objectives of
deterring and incapacitating rapists.35 Theoretically, the com-
Consider National Victim Center, Rape in America at 7 (cited in note 5) (rape vic-
tims suffer much higher rates of depression, drug use, and attempted suicide than do non-
victims of crime).
' Gordon and Riger, The Female Fear at 27 (cited in note 6) C'[D]ate-rape victims of-
ten feel they won't be believed . . . and, therefore, there is no point in reporting [the
rape]."). Consider the following comparison, made in connection with a story about a
woman who told a friend, "I'm not sure, but I think I've been raped," after a man forced
himself on her when she changed her mind about going to the man's apartment:
How does it happen that a woman comes to such a tentative conclusion about herself
as a victim of a violent crime? People don't come home to find the locks torn off their
doors and their belongings strewn all over and say: I'm not sure, but I think our
house [has] been broken into.
Diane Mason, Navigating the Dark Ages of Rape, St Petersburg Times 1D (Dec 4, 1990).
As Gordon and Riger explain:
[R]esearchers argue that campus rape may be so prevalent because of norms in our
society that condone sexual violence. People are conditioned to accept sexual roles in
which male aggression is an acceptable part of our modem courtship culture. Ac-
cording to this line of reasoning, campus rapists are ordinary males operating in an
ordinary social context, not even knowing they are doing something wrong, let alone
against the law.
Gordon and Riger, The Female Fear at 28 (cited in note 6). See also Waldron, et al, Sexual
Assault in Massachusetts at 48 (cited in note 8) (citing a study of college students that
found "one out of twelve male students reported behavior that met legal rape or attempted
rape standards, but none of the same students identified themselves as rapists," and cit-
ing a survey of adolescents showing that 20 percent or more believed that forced sex was
justified in certain situations). Catharine MacKinnon has argued:
Many women are raped by men who know the meaning of their acts to their victims
perfectly well and proceed anyway. But women are also violated every day by men
who have no idea of the meaning of their acts to the women. To them it is sex. There-
fore, to the law it is sex .... Men set sexual mores ideologically and behaviorally, de-
fine rape as they imagine women to be sexually violated through distinguishing that
from their image of what they normally do, and sit in judgment in most accusations
of sex crimes.
MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State at 180-81 (cited in note 20) (internal
citation omitted).
See generally Edmund L. Pincoffs, The Rationale of Legal Punishment (Humanities
1966) (assessing the traditional rationales for criminal punishment: retribution and deter-
rence). Consider Lobsenz, 15 Crim L Bull at 301-02 (cited in note 16) (conceptualizing
criminal law (as distinct from tort) as a sort of class action on behalf of potential future
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plainant could use the threat of criminal sanctions to win a civil
settlement equal in amount to the monetary value to the defen-
dant of the expected civil and criminal penalties the defendant
faces. If this were the case, civil settlement would not reduce the
deterrent effect of criminal law.
In reality, pretrial settlements are unlikely to deter ade-
quately. If the punishment for convicted rapists represents the
social judgment of the amount of punishment necessary to deter
the defendant, then pretrial settlement will deter adequately only
if the defendant is forced to settle for an amount equal to the
monetary value of the expected disutility to the defendant of trial
and punishment ("optimal amount"). Since the complainant can
always refuse to settle and thereby send the defendant to trial (or
plea bargain), a complainant seeking to maximize the settlement
should be able to negotiate a settlement with the defendant for
the optimal amount.36 However, this ideal situation is unlikely to
occur. The complainant's unwillingness to go to trial and her de-
sire to avoid the trauma of testifying weaken her bargaining posi-
tion and affect her ability credibly to threaten the defendant with
trial if he fails to settle for the optimal amount. The defendant
will be able to settle for less than the optimal amount. And since
rape defendants as a group can expect to settle for less than the
optimal amount, they will be underdeterred from committing
rapes."
In addition, pretrial settlement reduces the prosecutor's in-
centive to investigate allegations of rape. If a complainant can
withdraw her participation in the investigation after a settle-
ment, prosecutors will be less likely to invest resources in gath-
ering evidence that they will never use.3"
victims for injunction, usually in the form of imprisonment). The analysis in the text ap-
plies to both specific and general deterrence.
Subject to any possible strategic posturing due to the fact that this negotiation in-
volves a bilateral monopoly. Bilateral monopoly occurs when neither side of a potential
transaction can make the transaction with any other party. Because neither side faces
competition, the outcome of the negotiations is uncertain. For example, the defendant
could lower the settlement amount if he could convince the complainant he would be will-
ing to go to trial if the settlement demand is above some arbitrarily low amount. But, for
the reasons described in the text, it is doubtful such a bluff would be effective, given the
stakes involved.
' Note that if the defendant does not settle, a plea bargain is much more likely than
conviction at trial Although a plea bargain also involves negotiation with the threat of a
trial in the background, a plea bargain is more likely to deter the optimal amount. Since
the prosecutor seeks convictions and long sentences, and does not fear going to trial, she
will be able to threaten trial credibly if the defendant does not plea for a punishment




F. Commodification of Rape and Criminal Sanctions
Perhaps the most viscerally objectionable quality of pretrial
settlement is that it can be characterized as the defendant paying
his victim for the rape. In this respect, pretrial settlement may
commodify rape.39
Commodification occurs when something previously not
thought of in terms of monetary value, such as love or a human
organ, is exchanged for money or described using market rheto-
ric.40 Commodification can be harmful because it molds social
meaning.41 A rape "market" makes us "feel discomfort or even in-
sult, and we feel degradation or even loss of the value involved,
when bodily integrity is conceived of as a fungible object." 2
Pretrial settlement may commodify rape in two distinct
ways. Broadly, pretrial settlement commodifies rape because a
rapist can "pay" for a rape after the fact. Rape is not commodified
completely because individuals cannot buy and sell rape before
the fact,43 but settlement (and civil litigation generally) creates an
imperfect market in which the rape is legitimized, after the fact,
for a price. Under this view, complete noncommodification of rape
would entail barring all payments of money damages in every
civil rape case. Settlements paid before, or in lieu of, criminal tri-
als are most conducive to rape's commodification because they
preclude the imposition of nonmonetary sanctions for rape.
Narrowly, pretrial settlement commodifies rape punishment
by assigning a price to nonmonetary sanctions like stigma and in-
carceration. In this context, pretrial settlement can create the
perception of the state promoting commodification. By displacing
criminal remedies with monetary payments, pretrial settlement
makes rape punishment more like remedies for tort than pun-
ishment for crime," weakening the social judgment of the seri-
ousness of rape. Commodification of punishment may undermine
' Of course, some scholars argue that commodification is not socially harmful See, for
example, Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice 115 (Harvard 1981); Elizabeth M.
Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J Legal Stud 323
(1978). See also Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv L Rev 1849, 1857-
58 n 38 (1987) (describing the "universal commodification" approach of the scholarship of
Richard Posner and Gary Becker).
Radin, 100 Harv L Rev at 1855 n 24, 1859 (cited in note 39) (defining the term
"commodity").
" See id at 1877-87 (discussing the flaws of commodification: "risk of error," "injury to
personhood," and transformation of the "texture of the human world").
" Id at 1881. Radin goes on to argue that a market for rape "implicitly [ ] assume[s]
that raping 'benefits' rapists. Only an inferior conception of human flourishing would re-
gard rape as benefiting the rapist." Id at 1884.
"By definition, rape is nonconsensual and thus cannot be agreed upon ex ante.
" See note 35.
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the social significance and opprobrium attached to imprison-
ment.45
II. THE LAw REGULATING INFLUENCE OVER
VICTIMS AND WITNESSES
A. Tampering Statutes
Various state statutes prohibit defendants and potential de-
fendants from using persuasion, money, threats, deceit, or force
to influence the conduct of witnesses and victims before and
during criminal investigations and prosecutions.46
Most states have statutes that prohibit influencing a wit-
ness's testimony. At least thirty-four states and the District of
Columbia explicitly forbid an offer of money, a "benefit," or any-
thing of value to a witness with intent to influence her testimony
or attendance at trial.4 7 At least twenty-seven states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia prohibit attempts to induce false testimony,
withholding of testimony, or nonattendance at trial that do not
' Of course, the state commodifies the punishment for many crimes by imposing fines.
Rape, however, has traditionally been punished by imprisonment (or death). See generally
Coker v Georgia, 433 US 584, 593, 597-98 (1977) (striking down death penalty for rape of
an adult woman).
"States have enacted these statutes under a dizzying array of titles. Section headings
include acceding to corruption, bribing a witness, communicating with jurors and wit-
nesses, compounding a crime, indirect contempt, influencing testimony, influencing wit-
ness, interference with official proceedings, intimidating a witness, obstruction of justice,
retaliation against a witness or victim, tampering with witnesses, and threatening wit-
nesses. Despite the vast array of names, the substance of these statutes varies very little
from state to state. Because of this substantive similarity, this Comment refers to the por-
tions of these statutes that prohibit payments to victim-witnesses collectively as "tam-
pering statutes."
" Codifications usually refer to this as bribing, influencing, or tampering with a wit-
ness. See Ala Code § 13A-10-121 (Michie 1994); Alaska Stat § 11.56.510(2) (1998); Ariz
Rev Stat Ann § 13-2802 (West 1989); Ark Code Ann § 5-53-108 (1997); Cal Penal Code
§§ 137(a), 138(a) (West 1988); Colo Rev Stat Ann § 18-8-703 (West 1990); Conn Gen Stat
Ann § 53a-149 (West 1994); 11 Del Code Ann § 1261 (1995); DC Code § 22-713(a)(1) (1996);
Fla Stat Ann § 914.22 (West 1996); Ga Code Ann § 16-10-93(a) (Michie 1996 & Supp
1998); Hawaii Rev Stat § 710-1070(1) (1993); Idaho Code § 18-2605 (1997); 720 ILCS
§§ 5/32-4, 33-1(a)-(b) (1998) (formerly Ill Rev Stat ch 38, 32-4, 33-1(a)-(b)); Ind Code
§ 34-4-7-4 (1988); Iowa Code Ann §§ 720.4, 722.1 (West 1993); Ky Rev Stat Ann § 524.020
(1985); 17-A Me Rev Stat Ann § 454.1.B (1983 & Supp 1998); Mass Ann Laws ch 268,
§ 13B (Law Co-op 1992 & Supp 1999); Minn Stat Ann § 609.42 subd 1(3) (West 1987); Mo
Ann Stat § 575.270.1(3) (Vernon 1995 & Supp 1999); Neb Rev Stat § 28-918(1) (1995); Nev
Rev Stat § 199.240 (1997); NM Stat Ann § 30-24-3A(1) (1994 & Supp 1998); 1999 NY Laws
215.00; ND Cent Code § 12.1-09-01.1 (1997); Ohio Rev Code Ann § 2921.02(C) (Baldwin
1997); Or Rev Stat § 162.265 (1997); RI Gen Laws § 11-7-11 (1994); SD Cod Laws § 22-11-
19 (1998); Tenn Code Ann § 39-16-107(a)(1) (1997); Tex Penal Code Ann § 36.05(a)
(Vernon 1994 & Supp 1999); Va Code § 18.2-441.1 (1996); Wis Stat Ann § 946.61(1)(a)
(West 1996); Wyo Stat Ann § 6-5-102(a)(i) (1997).
4Unlike most statutes prohibiting payments to witnesses, statutes prohibiting other
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involve payments, threats, fraud, or force.49 At least thirty-eight
states and the District of Columbia forbid the use of threats or
force against a witness with intent to influence her testimony or
attendance." At least twenty-nine states and the District of Co-
lumbia prohibit witnesses from accepting or soliciting money with
intent to have their testimony or attendance influenced."
non-violent inducements do not bar influencing a witness to give truthful testimony.
', This crime is most often called tampering with a witness. See Ala Code § 13A-10-
124 (Michie 1994); Alaska Stat §§ 11.56.540, 545 (1998); Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 13-2804
(West 1989); Ark Code Ann § 5-53-110 (1997); Cal Penal Code §§ 136.1(a), 137(c) (West
1988 & Supp 1999); Colo Rev Stat Ann § 18-8-707 (West 1990); Conn Gen Stat Ann § 53a-
151 (West 1994); 11 Del Code Ann § 1263(1) (1995); DC Code § 22-722(a)(2)-(3)(A) (1996);
Fla Stat Ann § 914.22(2)(a)-(d); Hawaii Rev Stat § 710-1072 (1993); Idaho Code § 18-2604
(1997); 720 ILCS § 5/32-4(a); Ind Code § 34-4-7-4; Kan Stat Ann § 21-3832(a)(1) (1995); Ky
Rev Stat Ann § 524.050 (1985); 17-A Me Rev Stat Ann § 454.1.A (1983 & Supp 1998); Md
Ann Code Art 27, § 26 (1996); Mo Ann Stat § 575.270.1(2)-(3) (Vernon 1995 & Supp 1999);
Mont Code Ann § 45-7-206 (1997); Neb Rev Stat § 28-919 (1995); Nev Rev Stat § 199.230
(1997); NJ Stat Ann § 2C:28-5a (West 1995); 1999 NY Laws 215.10; Or Rev Stat § 162.285
(1997); Utah Code Ann § 76-8-508(1) (1995); 13 Vt Stat Ann § 3015 (Equity 1998); Wash
Rev Code Ann § 91A.72.120 (West 1998).
' These sections are often labeled intimidating a witness. See Ala Code § 13A-10-123
(Michie 1997); Alaska Stat § 11.56.510(1) (1998); Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 13-2802; Ark Code
Ann § 5-53-109 (1997); Cal Penal Code § 137(b) (West 1998); Colo Rev Stat Ann §§ 18-8-
704, 705 (West 1990 & 1998 Supp); 11 Del Code Ann § 1263(2)-(3) (1995); DC Code § 22-
722(a)(2)-(3)(A); Fla Stat Ann § 914.22(1)(a)-(f); Ga Code Ann § 16-10-93 (Michie 1996 &
Supp 1998); Hawaii Rev Stat § 710-1071 (1993); Idaho Code § 18-2604; 720 ILCS § 5/32-
4(b); Ind Code §§ 34-4-7-4, 35-44-3-4 (1988); Iowa Code Ann § 720.4; Kan Stat Ann § 21-
3833; Ky Rev Stat Ann § 524.040 (1985 & Supp 1998); 17-A Me Rev Stat Ann § 454.1.B;
Md Ann Code Art 27, § 26; Mass Ann Laws ch 268, § 13B; Minn Stat Ann § 609.498 (West
1997 & Supp 1999); Miss Code § 97-9-55 (1994); Mo Ann Stat § 575.270.1(1)-(2) (Vernon
1995 & Supp 1999); Nev Rev Stat § 199.240; NM Stat Ann § 30-24-3A(2) (1994 & Supp
1998); 1999 NY Laws 215.11-13, 15-17; NC Gen Stat Ann § 14-226 (Michie 1993); ND Cent
Code § 12.1-09-01.1; Ohio Rev Code Ann §§ 2921.03-04 (Baldwin 1997); 18 Pa Cons Stat
Ann § 4952 (Purdon 1983); RI Gen Laws § 11-32-5 (1994); SC Code Ann § 16-9-340 (1985
& Supp 1998); SD Cod Laws § 22-11-19; Tex Penal Code Ann § 36.06(a)(2) (Vernon 1994
& Supp 1999); 13 Vt Stat Ann § 3015; Va Code § 18.2-460 (1996); Wash Rev Code Ann
§ 9A.72.110 (West 1998); Wis Stat Ann §§ 940.42-45 (West 1996 & Supp 1998); Wyo Stat
Ann § 6-5-305 (1997).
" See Ala Code § 13A-10-122 (Michie 1994); Alaska Stat § 11.56.520 (1998); Ariz Rev
Stat Ann § 13-2803 (West 1989); Cal Penal Code § 138(b) (West 1998); Colo Rev Stat Ann
§ 18-8-603 (West 1990); Conn Gen Stat Ann § 53a-150 (West 1994); 11 Del Code Ann
§ 1262 (1995); DC Code § 22-713(a)(2) (1996); Ga Code Ann § 16-10-92 (1996); Hawaii Rev
Stat § 710-1070(2) (1993); Idaho Code § 18-2606 (1997); 720 ILCS § 5/33-1(d)-(e) (formerly
Ill Rev Stat ch 38, 33-1(d)-(e)); Iowa Code Ann § 722.2 (West 1993); Ky Rev Stat Ann
§ 524.030 (1985); 17-A Me Rev Stat Ann § 454.1.C (1983 & Supp 1998); Minn Stat Ann
§ 609.42 subd 1(4) (West 1997); Mo Ann Stat § 575.280(2) (Vernon 1995); Neb Rev Stat
§ 28-918(3) (1995); Nev Rev Stat § 199.250 (1997); NJ Stat Ann § 2C:28-5c (West 1995);
1999 NY Laws 215.05; ND Cent Code § 12.1-09-01.2 (1997); Ohio Rev Code Ann
§ 2921.02(D) (Baldwin 1997); Or Rev Stat § 162.275 (1997); 18 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 4909
(Purdon,1983 & Supp 1998); RI Gen Laws § 11-7-11; SD Cod Laws § 22-11-20 (1998); Tenn
Code Ann § 39-16-107(a)(2) (1997); Utah Code Ann § 76-8-508(2)(b) (1995); Wis Stat Ann
§ 946.61(1)(b) (West 1996 & Supp 1998); Wyo Stat Ann § 6-5-102(a)(ii) (1997).
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Some states also prohibit influencing a victim's decision to
press charges. At least twelve states and the District of Columbia
bar dissuading a victim from filing a complaint or otherwise pur-
suing prosecution 2 At least twenty-five states prohibit the accep-
tance of money not to seek prosecution. 3 Significantly, several of
those states provide, by statute, an affirmative defense that the
payment made to dissuade the victim from prosecuting does not
exceed the amount reasonably due to the victim as restitution.'
Finally, a few states explicitly authorize the court to enjoin the
defendant from violating tampering statutes or otherwise com-
municating with the victim.55
B. The Scope of Tampering Statutes
Tampering statutes and statutes barring the use of threats
and force against a witness or victim reach many possible inter-
actions between defendants and complainants.56 These statutes
' See Cal Penal Code § 136.1(b) (West 1988 & Supp 1999); DC Code § 22-722(a)(3)
(1996); Fla Stat Ann § 914.22; Ga Code Ann § 16-10-92; 720 ILCS §5/32-1 (formerly Ill Rev
Stat ch 38, 32-1); Ky Rev Stat Ann § 519.030(1)(b) (1985); 17-A Me Rev Stat Ann
§ 754.1.A (1983 & Supp 1998); Mo Ann Stat § 575.270.1(3); NJ Stat Ann § 2C:29-4 (West
1995); NM Stat Ann § 30-24-3A(3) (1994); 1999 NY Laws 215.45.1(b); SD Cod Laws § 22-
11-10 (1998); Tex Penal Code Ann § 36.05(a)(5).
This crime is almost universally termed compounding. See Hawaii Rev Stat § 710-
1013 (1993); 720 ILCS §5/32-1; Iowa Code Ann § 720.1 (West 1993); Kan Stat Ann § 21-
3807; Ky Rev Stat Ann § 519.030 (1985); Mass Ann Laws ch 268, § 36 (Law Co-op 1992);
17-A Me Rev Stat Ann 754.1.B (1983 & Supp 1998); Mich Comp Laws Ann § 750.149
(West 1991); Minn Stat Ann § 609.42 subd 1(5) (West 1987); Miss Code Ann §§ 97-9-7, 9
(1994); Mont Code Ann § 45-7-305; Nev Rev Stat § 199.290; NJ Stat Ann § 2C:29-4; NM
Stat Ann §§ 30-22-6, 30-24-3.1A(2) (1994); 1999 NY Laws 215.45; Ohio Rev Code Ann
§ 2921.21 (Baldwin 1997); 21 Okla Stat Ann §§ 543-44 (West 1983 & Supp 1999); Or Rev
Stat § 162.335; 18 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 5108 (Purdon 1983 & Supp 1998); SC Code Ann
§ 16-9-370 (1985); SD Cod Laws § 22-11-10; Tenn Code Ann § 39-16-604 (1997); Va Code
§ 18.2-462 (1996); Wis Stat Ann § 946.67 (West 1996 & Supp 1998); Wyo Stat Ann § 6-5-
203 (1997).
' These statutes suggest that legislatures have considered the application of tamper-
ing laws to payments that would satisfy civil claims. Some legislatures have made the
judgment that some such payments should not be illegal. See 17-A Me Rev Stat Ann
§ 754.3.B (1983); NJ Stat Ann § 2C:29-4; 1999 NY Laws 215.45.2; ND Cent Code § 12.1-
09-01.3.b (1997); SD Cod Laws § 22-11-11; Tenn Code Ann § 39-16-604(c); Texas Penal
Code Ann § 36.05(c) (Vernon 1994); Wis Stat Ann §§ 946.61(2), 67(2) (West 1996 & Supp
1998).
See Cal Penal Code § 136.2 (West 1988 & Supp 1999); Kan Stat Ann § 21-3834
(1995); NJ Stat Ann § 2C:28-5.1 (West 1995).
Tampering statutes are written in inclusive terms like "induce" or "influence." See,
for example, Cal Penal Code § 137(c) ("Every person who knowingly induces another per-
son to give false testimony [or material information] or withhold true testimony [or mate-
rial information] is guilty of [tampering]."); Idaho Code § 18-2604 ("Any person who.., by
any manner willfully [ ] influences, impedes, deters.., or prevents a witness.., from tes-
tifying freely, fully, and truthfully ... is guilty of [intimidation].").
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prohibit offers or payments of money5' and the use of threats,
force, harassment,58 or even verbal persuasion 9 to affect the vic-
tim's conduct vis-A-vis the potential prosecution. In fact, defen-
dants have attacked (unsuccessfully) similarly worded bribery
statutes on the constitutional grounds of overbreadth and vague-
ness.
60
Courts have construed the purposes and functions of tam-
pering statutes broadly to prevent the miscarriage or subversion
of justice. For example, the Supreme Court of Colorado described
a tampering statute as "protect[ing] against conduct which would
threaten the veracity and cooperation of witnesses by prohibiting
any attempt to induce another to testify falsely or otherwise sub-
vert the administration of justice."6' The New York Court of Ap-
peals characterized the purpose of a bribery statute as "to guard
against corrupt interference with the judicial system" and
"against subversion of judicial proceedings by suppressing needed
evidence."62 And a Washington state court emphasized the con-
nection between tampering statutes and the enforcement of
criminal laws, concluding: "Witness tampering is an offense
against the very object for which the courts are established....
There is a direct, elemental nexus between the act of tampering
and the underlying crime."6' Thus, witness tampering statutes
serve as a sort of meta-criminal law, enforcement of which en-
ables the enforcement of the rest of criminal law.
Courts overwhelmingly have given tampering statutes ex-
pansive constructions. Courts construe "witness" to include a pre-
sent or potential witness, regardless of whether a complaint has
been filed or proceedings initiated." A person can remain a wit-
5, See note 47.
See note 50.
See note 49.
See, for example, Bachlet v State, 941 P2d 200, 203-06 (Alaska App 1997) (holding
that the Alaska statute prohibiting bribery of officials is not unconstitutionally overbroad
or vague); State v Greco, 57 Wash App 196, 787 P2d 940, 943 (1990) (holding that the
Washington statute prohibiting bribery of officials is not unconstitutionally overbroad
since a corrupt intent element is implied, ensuring that no protected activity is punished).
" People v Moyer, 670 P2d 785, 791 (Colo 1983) (construing Colo Rev Stat Ann § 18-8-
605, CRS 1973 (1978 Repi Vol 8), repealed, replaced by Colo Rev Stat § 18-8-707).
6 People v Bell, 73 NY2d 153, 535 NE2d 1294, 1299-1300 (1989) (construing what is
now 1999 NY Laws § 215.00, bribing a witness). See also Staggs v State, 53 Ala App 314,
299 S2d 756, 766 (1974) (stating that the purpose of bribery statutes is "to prevent miscar-
riages of justice"), quoting Wilson v United States, 77 F2d 236, 240 (8th Cir 1935).
' State v Sanders, 66 Wash App 878, 833 P2d 452, 455 (1992) (construing Wash Rev
Code Ann § 9A.72.120(1)).
See, for example, Bell, 535 NE2d at 1300 ("[A]n individual's status as a witness de-
pends upon the evidence he can supply the court, not the immediacy of the need for the
evidence."); State v DeKay, 387 S2d 570, 572-73 (La 1980) (rejecting the argument that
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ness after conviction of the defendant," and can be a "victim"
even if the underlying crime is considered "victimless."66 A defen-
dant can be convicted of obstruction of justice, even if he never
communicates his threat to the witness and the witness never
hears of the threat.67 An offer of a bribe is sufficient for convic-
tion, even if the offer is not accepted and does not influence the
witness.68 It may not even be necessary to prove that the witness
or victim understood the offer to be corrupt.69 When the statute is
not limited explicitly to inducing false testimony, "influence" may
include payments for true testimony or for withholding testi-
mony.7
0
Against this general interpretive backdrop, courts sometimes
face cases where the defendant intends to influence the bringing
of charges, rather than testimony at trial. When the influence is
in the form of threats or violence, courts have not deviated from
victims were not witnesses because they had not yet been subpoenaed); State v Crider, 21
Ohio App 3d 268, 487 NE2d 911, 913 (1984) ("It would be ludicrous to hold that the victim,
who was intimidated, is not a 'witness'... because the victim has not yet had the oppor-
tunity to identify the offender, the prosecution had not issued a complaint against him, or
the police had not yet apprehended him to commence proceedings.").
' Smith v State, 902 P2d 1271, 1279 (Wyo 1995) (holding that the witness retained
status, under a federal obstruction of justice statute, while the case was on direct appeal).
"State v Vinje, 201 Wis 2d 98, 548 NW2d 118, 120-21 (Wis App 1996) (holding that
wife was "victim" of husband's "disorderly conduct").
' Irving v United States, 673 A2d 1284, 1289 (DC App 1996) (holding defendant's un-
completed endeavor to have a witness murdered sufficient to constitute the offense of ob-
struction of justice under DC Code § 22-722(a) (Supp 1995) because his actions demon-
strated the requisite mental state).
"See, for example, Moyer, 670 P2d at 791 ("Under the tampering statute, it is not
necessary that the defendant succeed in his attempt or actually induce the witness to do
anything."); People v Sajous, 173 Misc 2d 55, 661 NYS2d 488, 490 (Dist Ct 1997) ("[Tam-
pering with a witness] is committed if the attempt is made and regardless of whether or
not it is successful").
"See Staggs, 299 S2d at 764 ("What is meant by 'upon any understanding or agree-
ment that the testimony of such witness shall be thereby influenced' is that such is the
condition upon which the offer, gift or promise is made .... A rejection [does not erase]
the criminal act."). Compare Martinez v State, 696 SW2d 930, 932-33 (Tex App 1985)
("Common sense dictates that when it is alleged and proved that the defendant offered or
solicited a proscribed benefit, it is not necessary to further prove that the offer or solicita-
tion resulted in a bilateral arrangement or unlawful contract with the other party."), and
Hubbard v State, 668 SW2d 419, 420-21 (Tex App 1984) ("The offense [of bribe giving or
receiving] focuses on the mental state of the actor, and is complete if [the actor] ... in-
tends an agreement."), with McCallum v State, 686 SW2d 132, 136 (Tex Crim App 1985)
(holding that when indictment alleged a completed bribe, there must be a "bilateral
agreement" between the parties). Note that these Texas cases all involved bribery of pub-
lic officials rather than witnesses.
" See People v Gliksman, 78 Cal App 3d 343, 144 Cal Rptr 451, 455-56 (1978) C'mhe
Legislature, when it used the general term 'influenced,' intended... [to reach] one who
would condition the giving oftrue testimony upon the payment of a bribe."). But see State
v Halleck, 308 NW2d 56, 59 (Iowa 1981) ("Merely offering restitution if the witness tells
the truth, however, is not prohibited.").
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their broad textual approach to enforcement.7 However, when no
threats are involved, or when money changes hands, courts do
not apply the tampering statutes consistently. Instead, courts
take several different approaches to payments-including osten-
sible settlements-made to a victim to ensure that the victim
does not testify or that the charges are dropped.
On one end of the spectrum is Lichens v Superior Court,2 in
which the California Supreme Court construed the state bribery
statute narrowly and held that payments made to a victim to
drop attempted rape charges did not violate the statute.73 The de-
fendant in Lichens approached the complainant's husband offer-
ing "$500 if the victim would drop the case."74 When the victim
adamantly refused, the defendant contacted the victim and her
husband twice more, "stat[ing] that [the victim's] sister's and her
mother's names would be dragged into the papers and that a gen-
eral 'stink' about the whole thing would be stirred up... and a
lot of people are going to get hurt."75 The court interpreted the
statute to require an agreement that the witness not attend trial;
paying the victim to drop the charges was not enough to establish
a violation. 6
Following the reasoning of Lichens, some courts declare flatly
that "agreeing to 'drop' charges is certainly not the same as
agreeing to alter testimony or absent oneself entirely from a pro-
ceeding," as required by most bribery statutes. 77 One court ap-
plied this reasoning in overturning a tampering conviction in
which the defendant offered money to the complainant to drop
the rape charges and provided the complainant with a memoran-
, See, for example, In re Phillippa P., 221 AD2d 159, 633 NYS2d 287, 288 (1995) (re-
jecting "argument that [NY Laws § 215.15] is inapplicable to attempts to coerce a com-
plainant to [drop charges]"); State v James, 88 Wash App 812, 946 P2d 1205, 1207 (1997)
(applying Wash Rev Code § 9A.72.110(1) (1985) to criminalize threats made by a person in
an attempt to prevent the reporting of a crime).
181 Cal App 2d 573, 5 Cal Rptr 539 (1960).
5 Cal Rptr at 541-42. The bribery statute read, in relevant part: "[E]very person who
attempts by means of any offer of a bribe to dissuade any [witness or person about to be
called as a witness] from attending upon any trial, is guilty of a felony." Id.
7, Id at 541.
Id.
7' Id.
People v Harper, 75 NY2d 313, 552 NE2d 148, 150 (1990). See also People v Cribas,
231 Cal App 3d 596, 282 Cal Rptr 538, 546 (1991) CAsking [the complainant] to withdraw
the charges is no more the equivalent of influencing her testimony than it is of inducing
her not to attend trial."); Sheppard v State, 484 NE2d 984, 988 (Ind App 1985) (construing
Ind Code § 35-44-3-4 (1982), and finding that defendanes request to an acquaintance not
to pick him out of a lineup did not violate the obstruction of justice statute absent any
showing of "coercion" and stating that "criminal statutes are to be strictly construed
against the state").
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dum of "the most important things to remember," which the com-
plainant later testified contained false information."8
On the other end of the spectrum, some courts apply tam-
pering statutes aggressively to payments not to prosecute, and
even to pretrial settlements. In State v Al, 79 the court affirmed a
conviction for attempting to bribe a witness where the defendant
offered the complainant "a 'tax-free' $20,000 settlement... in ex-
change for the victim's decision not to pursue the rape charges." °
The court rejected the defendant's contention that the offer of
payment was like a "suggest[ion] [of] a monetary settlement,"
stating that the "circumstances surrounding [the defendant's] 'of-
fer of settlement' were highly suspicious."
2
In People v Pic,"3 the court stated that "no express state-
ment of the purpose of a bribe is needed in order for the factfinder
to gather.., that the accused sought to persuade a witness to ab-
sent himself.... '[S]uch a solicitation may be in the form of words
which carry the import of a bribe and were evidently intended to
be so understood."'' 4 Although the statute's express language pro-
hibited only "any bribe [made] upon any understanding or
agreement that the testimony of [the] witness shall be thereby in-
fluenced," the court held that "[t]he grand jury had probable
cause to believe that defendant intended to influence [complain-
ant's] testimony by way of persuading him to withhold it alto-
gether."5 The "defendant himself testified that the only act a wit-
ness can perform to prevent prosecution in nonmisdemeanor
cases is to 'refuse to testify."'6
" State v LaPointe, 418 NW2d 49, 50-52 (Iowa 1988) (holding that under a statute
prohibiting payments to "improperly influence... [the witness's] testimony... or to pre-
vent such person from testifying," offering money to "deter a victim from pursuing crimi-
nal charges ... simply is not prohibited by the express terms of [the statute]"). The courts
decision was based, in part, on the fact that after the defendant first offered to compensate
the victim for her injuries, he never did so again, and'the two resumed their prior intimate
relationship. Id at 51.
7' 1996 Tenn Crim App LEXIS 617.
8 Id at *15-16.
"Id at *15.
Id. See also DeKay, 387 S2d at 572, which involved an offer by a sex offense defen-
dant to "settle the case" with the victims by giving them $5000 in exchange for affidavits
swearing he committed no wrongdoing. The court upheld the conviction for bribery.
31 Cal 3d 731, 646 P2d 847 (1982). Pic'l arose out of a theft prosecution.
646 P2d at 852.
Id at 853 (quoting Cal Penal Code §137).
646 P2d at 852. In Halleck, 308 NW2d at 58-59, also involving a theft prosecution,
the defendant merely asked the victim to tell the prosecutor that he had received restitu-
tion and was not interested in prosecution, but the court inferred that payment of restitu-
tion illegally induced the victim's subsequent testimony.
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In addition, courts' construction of tampering statutes may
vary according to the amount of overlap between statutes, as is
demonstrated by a set of cases from Illinois."7 In People v Scrib-
ner," the Illinois Supreme Court held that the communicating
with a witness statute, which prohibits an offer of payment to a
witness "with intent to deter any [party or] witness from testify-
ing freely, fully and truthfully to any matter pending in any
court,"89 does not apply to a defendant's offer of money to keep a
complainant from coming to court. 0 However, the court stated
that the conduct did constitute compounding a crime, a separate
offense specifically prohibiting payments "not to prosecute"" for
which the defendants had not been indicted." The court con-
cluded, "[W]e do not believe the legislature intended section 32-4
of the Criminal Code [ ] as a duplicate of section 32-1 of the Code
and thus entirely superfluous."93
However, in People v Jackson,94 an Illinois court construed
tampering statutes more broadly in the absence of statutory
overlap. Following the reasoning of Scribner, the court dismissed
an indictment for communicating with a witness but affirmed a
conviction for bribery of a defendant who had offered the alleged
assault victim twenty-five dollars to drop charges after the trial
had begun." In Illinois, bribery requires "intent to influence the
performance of any act related to the employment or function of
any ... witness."" The court held that a jury reasonably could
find the payment was intended to influence "the performance of
an act related to the function of a witness."97 This was true, the
court noted, even though the complainant would request that the
charges be dropped in her role as complainant, not witness.98
In sum, when a violation of a tampering statute involves an
alleged pretrial settlement, courts have not consistently applied
tampering statutes. Worse, there are few cases-and even fewer
' Like most states, Illinois has numerous statutes prohibiting various forms of tam-
pering. See 720 ILCS §§ 5/32-1, 32-4, 33-1(a)-(b), (d)-(e).
108 Ill App 3d 1138, 440 NE2d 160 (1982).
440 NE2d at 164 (quoting Ill Rev Stat ch 38, 32-4).
"440 NE2d at 164.
91 Ill Rev Stat ch 38, 32-1, cited in Scribner, 440 NE2d at 164.
92 Scribner, 440 NE2d at 165.
Id. People v Robinson, 186 Il1 App 3d 1, 541 NE2d 1336 (1989), involving a defen-
dant in a sexual assault prosecution, followed Scribner, dismissing communicating with a
witness charges when a payment not to testify was not alleged.
231 IMl App 3d 801, 596 NE2d 1251 (1992).
596 NE2d at 1251-52.
Id at 1252 (quoting Ill Rev Stat ch 38, 33-1(a)).
596 NE2d at 1253.
Id.
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involving rape prosecutions 99-- to guide future courts."'0 Thus, it
seems that a prosecution of a rape defendant for offering a pre-
trial settlement in order to induce the victim not to press the
prosecution would present difficult, and probably novel, questions
in most, if not all, jurisdictions. The reasons for choosing a par-
ticular interpretation of tampering statutes in cases involving
rape defendants need to be articulated.
III. How COURTS SHOULD INTERPRET TAMPERING STATUTES IN
PROSECUTIONS FOR PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT IN RAPE CASES
Courts should allow the finder of fact to find witness or vic-
tim tampering when there is evidence that a pretrial settlement
was designed to influence the complainant's participation in the
prosecution. Although few reported cases discuss the application
of tampering statutes to pretrial settlement, this interpretation of
tampering statutes is consistent with the text, purposes, and
structure of tampering statutes.0 1 In addition, in rape prosecu-
tions, allowing a finder of fact to infer intent to influence the
complainant from the circumstances surrounding the pretrial set-
tlement is consistent with the willingness of courts to draw infer-
ences in cases of alleged intimidation of witnesses.
A. The Statutory Interpretation Argument
Courts have rarely interpreted tampering statutes in relation
to pretrial settlements.0 2 A thorough analysis of tampering stat-
utes, however, suggests that courts should review pretrial settle-
ments for violations of tampering statutes. As with all criminal
statutes, the interpretation of tampering statutes should look to
the text, purposes, and structure of the statutes in order to find
the meaning that most makes sense of them.0 3
Lichens, Robinson, Ali, and DeKay are rare examples of such cases. Also, in a pair of
unreported Connecticut cases, two attorneys were prosecuted for negotiating a $10,000
restitution payment to a rape complainant in an arrangement that involved getting a psy-
chiatrist to prepare a statement saying the trial would be "too traumatic" for the com-
plainant. Etkind, A Hazy, Hazardous Line, Conn L Trib (cited in note 14).
"This is almost certainly because pretrial settlement rarely involves prosecutors, and
few settlements are subject to prosecutorial scrutiny without the complainants request. It
is likely that most successful attempts to influence the complainant with a pretrial set-
tlement escape review. Consider id (indicating that pretrial settlements and other bar-
gains are "as commonplace as [they are] risky").
"'As noted above, the texts of most tampering statutes are remarkably similar. Thus,
this Comment does not parse the text of particular statutes.
"But see Scribner, 440 NE2d at 162-63 (providing some analysis of two Illinois tam-
pering statutes).
" See, for example, Holloway v United States, 119 S Ct 966, 969 (1999) (following the
words of the statute and "also its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme"); Mus-
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The analysis begins with the statutory text. 104 The text
should be given its "plain and ordinary meaning""0 5 and a "com-
monsense reading."'0 6 The text of most states' tampering statutes
prohibits an offer of money to influence a victim or witness' ' or to
induce a victim not to seek prosecution.' 8 In rape prosecutions,
the alleged victim almost inevitably is a witness; thus, the com-
plainant is a "witness" within the ordinary meaning of most tam-
pering statutes--even those that do not apply explicitly to vic-
tims. In addition, pretrial settlements can induce complainants
not to testify or not to seek prosecution;' 9 the settlements enable
carello v United States, 524 US 125, 118 S Ct 1911, 1914-18 (1998) (looking to the statute's
language and evidence of legislative intent, and interpreting the statute to make "sense
of the statutory scheme).
"'See Holloway, 119 S Ct at 969; Muscarello, 118 S Ct at 1914; State v Jason B., 248
Conn 543, 729 A2d 760, 767 (1999) ("We start with the language of the statute.").
"Scribner, 440 NE2d at 164.
"Holloway, 119 S Ct at 970. "Generally, criminal statutes should be strictly con-
strued. Strict construction, however, does not require that statutes be given the narrowest
meaning allowed by the language; rather the language should be given 'a reasonable or
common sense construction.'" State v Jones, 750 P2d 828, 831 (Alaska App 1988). Accord
State v Ogden, 118 NM 234, 880 P2d 845, 854 (1994). See also Jones, 750 P2d at 831
('Common sense should be used to resolve questions of statutory construction when there
is little legislative history from which to determine the objectives of the legislature.").
"For examples of typical statutes prohibiting payments to influence testimony in
states without statutes prohibiting payments not to prosecute, see Ala Code § 13A-10-
124(a) (A person commits the crime of tampering with a witness if he attempts to induce
a witness... to: (1) Testify falsely or withhold testimony; or (2) Absent himself from any
official proceeding to which he has been legally summoned."); Ark Code § 5-53-110 ("A
person commits the offense of tampering if... he induces or attempts to induce another
person to: (1) Testify or inform falsely; or (2) Withhold any unprivileged testimony [or] in-
formation... or (4) Absent himself from any proceeding or investigation to which he has
been summoned."); Colo Rev Stat Ann § 18-8-703 (A person commits bribing a witness or
victim if he offers, confers, or agrees to confer any benefit upon a witness, or a victim ...
with intent to: (a) Influence the witness or victim to testify falsely or unlawfully withhold
testimony; or... (c) Induce the witness or victim to absent himself from an official pro-
ceeding to which he has been legally summoned."). Note that some statutes apply explic-
itly to witnesses and victims, and others only to witnesses.
"For examples of laws prohibiting payments not to prosecute, see 720 ILCS § 5/32-
1(a) ("A person compounds a crime when he ... offers to another any consideration for a
promise not to prosecute or aid in the prosecution of an offender."); 1999 NY Laws
215.45(1)(b) ("A person is guilty of compounding a crime when... [h]e confers, or offers or
agrees to confer, any benefit upon another person upon an agreement or understanding
that such other person will refrain from initiating a prosecution for a crime.").
"When the complainant seeks to end the prosecution, this entails, by necessity,
seeking not to attend trial and not to testify. Thus, it is irrelevant whether or not a state's
tampering statutes prohibit only the influencing of testimony. Since discontinuing prose-
cution is within the sole discretion of the prosecutor, a complainant may have to refuse to
testify in order to convince the prosecutor to dismiss the charges. In People v Cribas, 231
Cal App 3d 596, 282 Cal Rptr 538, 545 (1991), the California Attorney General argued
that it "would be ludicrous to conclude that an agreement to get the witness 'to drop' a
case does not reasonably mean 'to influence a witness not to testify.'... [Blecause [the
complainant has no] authority to dismiss the case, the only way she could drop the
charges was by refusing to testify." See also Pic'l, 646 P2d at 852 (noting that the defen-
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complainants to avoid continuing the prosecution and being sub-
ject to the humiliation and trauma of testifying about their expe-
riences in court. In light of these facts, common sense compels the
conclusion that the statutory text of most tampering statutes ap-
plies to pretrial settlements.
Further, penal statutes should be construed "in light of the
evil sought to be remedied."1 ' Courts have suggested that the
purpose of tampering statutes is to prevent obstruction of judicial
proceedings."' Because rape defendants can effectively employ
pretrial settlement to prevent the initiation or completion of
prosecutions," 2 it would be unfaithful to the purposes of tamper-
ing statutes to allow the resolution of civil claims- to enable de-
fendants to avoid criminal claims."' Otherwise, pretrial settle-
ment becomes a loophole that defeats the primary purpose of
tampering statutes. Given the social cost of foregone rape prose-
cutions," 4 closing this loophole is especially important.
The structure of some states' tampering statutes provides
additional evidence that it would be prudent to construe tam-
pering statutes to cover pretrial rape settlements as this Com-
ment suggests. Some states provide an affirmative defense to a
tampering prosecution if the payment made to get the charges
dropped does not exceed the amount reasonably due as restitu-
tion."' This indicates that some legislatures intended to protect
some pretrial settlements from prosecution for tampering.
dant admitted that refusing to testify was the only way the complainant could fulfill his
agreement to do everything in complainanes power to prevent the prosecution).
"'State v Richard Knutson, Inc, 196 Wis 2d 86, 537 NW2d 420, 423 (1995), citing State
v Trimm, 163 Wis 2d 894, 472 NW2d 593, 595 (App 1991). See also Ogden, 880 P2d at 854
(CThe evils sought to be overcome should be given special attention.").
' See notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
"'See Part I.A.
"'This reading employs the commonsense observation that a transaction can be a
bribe in substance though perhaps not in form. State v Rempel, 114 Wash 2d 77, 785 P2d
1134, 1137 (1990) ("[A]n attempt to induce a witness to withhold testimony does not de-
pend only upon the literal meaning of the words used. The State is entitled to rely on the
inferential meaning of the words and the context in which they were used."); Pic'l, 646 P2d
at 852 ("Mhe cases have never suggested that the briber must parrot the precise words of
the statute in order to perpetrate the offense."); People v Mendoza, 59 Cal App 4th 1333,
69 Cal Rptr 2d 728, 735 (1997) ("There is, of course, no talismanic requirement that a de-
fendant must say 'Don't testify' or words tantamount thereto, in order to commit the
charged offenses [a]s long as his words or actions support the inference [of influence].").
". See Part I.D-F.
"'See note 54. Notably, two states have begun to require some form of state interven-
tion in pretrial settlements, one by statute and one by judicial decision. Tex Penal Code
Ann § 36.05(c) (payment of restitution must be negotiated or agreed to by prosecution in
order for the defense to apply); People v Anonymous B, 56 Misc 2d 792, 290 NYS2d 507,
511 (1968) (holding that restitution "is to be made subject to and under judicial control
and not as part of a bargain to avoid prosecution").
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In states where legislatures have not spoken on the question
of an affirmative defense, however, it is not clear what they
would say if they did address the issue. On the one hand, absence
of a defense may indicate that the legislature did not believe that
pretrial settlements would be reached at all by tampering stat-
utes; thus, there would be no need to include an affirmative de-
fense. On the other hand, given that the affirmative defense ex-
ists in some states, the absence of an affirmative defense in other
states may indicate a deliberate decision to expose pretrial set-
tlements to prosecution for violation of tampering statutes.
Although it is conceivable that some legislatures intended
pretrial settlements made with the intent to influence the com-
plainant to be legal, the text and purpose of tampering statutes
lead to a contrary conclusion: that such corrupt pretrial settle-
ment offers violate the law. Further, the fact that some states
have enacted an affirmative defense indicates that legislatures
are on notice that the broad language of tampering statutes
reaches payments that appear to settle civil claims while actually
affecting the criminal prosecution. And if some legislatures sim-
ply have not considered the application of tampering statutes to
these factual situations, then the text and purposes of the stat-
utes alone justify their application to pretrial settlements.
Even if legislative intent is somewhat unclear, prosecution of
corrupt pretrial settlements should still be sought, as the prose-
cutions will serve as an information-eliciting device: if for some
reason the legislature did not intend a tampering statute to be as
broad as its text indicates, prosecutions for corrupt pretrial set-
tlements will encourage revision of the statute by the legislature
to make it more clear. But speculation about legislative intent
when the tools of statutory interpretation yield a clear result
should not prevent courts from employing the commonsense in-
terpretation of the statute.
Finally, the "rule of lenity" is inapposite. The "rule of lenity"
requires that ambiguous criminal statutes be construed against
the state.116 The rule applies only if, after employing all the tools
of statutory construction, the court "can make no more than a
guess as to what [the legislature] intended."117 Because an analy-
"Muscarello, 118 S Ct at 1919; Ogden, 880 P2d at 853; State v Collins, 580 NW2d 36,
41 (Minn App 1998).
"Muscarello, 118 S Ct at 1919 ("To invoke the rule, we must conclude that there is a
grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute.") (internal quotations omitted); Ogden,
880 P2d at 853 ("[L]enity is reserved for those situations in which a reasonable doubt per-
sists about a statute's intended scope even after resort to the language and structure, leg-
islative history, and motivating policies of the statute.") (internal quotations omitted); Ja-
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sis of the text, purposes, and structure of tampering laws pro-
vides a clear indication of the scope of the statutes, the rule of
lenity should not apply to the application of tampering statutes to
pretrial settlements for rape.11 A few cases have held to the con-
trary, construing tampering statutes narrowly and invoking the
principle that "[c]riminal or penal statutes are to be construed
strictly in favor of the accused.""9 This is not a correct application
of the rule of lenity, which should be used only in the face of un-
resolvable ambiguity. Not to limit this rule in this manner would
reduce the interpretation of criminal statutes to absurdity, "for
most statutes are ambiguous to some degree."2 ' To the extent
these cases stand for narrow construction of tampering laws in
spite of their text and purpose, they should not be followed.
B. The Argument that Pretrial Settlement Is Analogous
to Intimidation
Courts have been willing to infer intent to influence a wit-
ness or victim in cases involving threats or force by the defen-
dant. '2 For example, a statement that, on its face, is merely an
expression of anger may, in context, create an inference of intent
to influence the witness's testimony through implied threats.
Pretrial settlements, unlike outbursts or violence, have a le-
gitimate purpose and are entitled to a presumption of legality;
however, like cases involving alleged threats, pretrial settlements
during a rape prosecution have great potential to influence the
son B., 729 A2d at 769 ("[W]e. .. reserve lenity for those situations in which a reasonable
doubt persists about a statute's intended scope even after resort to the language and
structure, legislative history, and motivating policies of the statute."), quoting Moskal v
United States, 498 US 103, 108 (1990) (internal citations omitted).
"' One concern that may motivate application of the rule of lenity here is adequate no-
tice to the defendant. The purpose of the rule of lenity "is to ensure that 'criminal statutes
will provide fair warning concerning conduct considered illegal." Collins, 580 NW2d at 41
(citations ommitted). Because the language of tampering statutes is clearly very broad,
there is little danger that a defendant will be unaware that paying someone with intent to
prevent the bringing of charges or testimony is illegal. Consider the unreported case de-
scribed in Smith and Edwards, Paying Off on Sex Crimes (cited in note 1): an attorney was
prosecuted for arranging a payment, ostensibly of restitution, to a rape complainant to get
the charges dropped. The attorney was recorded counseling his client, "You know you're
not allowed to pay someone not to testify. Between you and me, that's what it is, but I pre-
fer to think of it the other way"
"'Sheppard v State, 484 NE2d 984, 988 (Ind App 1985) (construing Ind Code § 35-44-
3-4 (obstruction of justice)).
"'Muscarello, 118 S Ct at 1919.
"'For example, the court in Mendoza found the statement that the witness had
"fucked up" defendant's brother's testimony with her own and that defendant was "going
to talk to some guys from [his street gang]" allowed the jury to infer both the elements of
(1) threat of force or violence and (2) attempt to prevent the witness from giving testimony
in the future. 69 Cal Rptr 2d at 734.
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complaining witness coercively. No less than threats and vio-
lence, pretrial settlement in rape cases should be scrutinized, be-
cause a complainant may be particularly vulnerable to pressure
from the defendant. 122 Pretrial settlement provides an avenue
through which the defendant can channel his (illegal) payment
and coerce the complainant.
123
Although pretrial settlement may seem innocuous, certain
facts may give rise to the inference that the defendant intended
to influence the complainant's cooperation with the prosecution.
The defendant, for example, can structure a pretrial settlement to
deter the complainant from pressing the prosecution. 124 Evidence
of harassment of the complainant,'25 concealment of negotiations
from authorities,'26 or efforts to remove the complainant from the
jurisdiction12 ' during or subsequent to settlement could inculpate
a defendant. Courts faced with an allegedly corrupt pretrial set-
tlement should be willing to draw inferences of criminal intent,
just as a court reviewing alleged threats would, when the facts of
the case warrant.
IV. THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE PROPOSED APPROACH
A. Benefits of the Proposed Approach
Applying tampering statutes to pretrial settlements in rape
prosecutions will help remedy some of the harms of pretrial set-
tlement by deterring defendants from offering pretrial settle-
ments in order to influence complainants not to cooperate with
the prosecution. This will reduce one pressure on the complainant
not to testify. Further, more defendants will be likely to plea bar-
gain, because they will be unable to sabotage the prosecution
with a pretrial settlement.2 ' Plea bargaining also obviates the
' See Part I.B.
'" See Part I.A.
'
24 See note 15 and accompanying text.
Compare Lichens, 5 Cal Rptr at 541 (described in text accompanying notes 72-76).
's See Ali, 1996 Tenn Crim App LEXIS 617 at *8 (recounting defendant's offer of cash
so the money would not have to be reported to the IRS and how the defendant initially
discouraged the victim's husband from involving an attorney).
'" See State v Sanders, 66 Wash App 878, 833 P2d 452, 459 (1992) (holding that evi-
dence that the statutory rape defendant first encouraged his wife to make the complain-
ant, her daughter, stop her accusations and then moved his wife and the complainant to a
home in another state was sufficient to convict him of witness tampering).
'"Note that most rape prosecutions are resolved by plea bargain. See Marsh, Geist
and Caplan, Rape and the Limits of Law Reform at 34 (cited in note 3) (finding that in
Michigan 66 percent of rape convictions were the result of a plea bargain). Although plea
bargains and pretrial settlements both avoid trial, there are two crucial distinctions be-
tween them. First, the prosecutor negotiates the plea bargain without any fear of trial to
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need for the victim to testify, thereby protecting any interest she
may have had in avoiding trial.
129
Scrutinizing pretrial settlement will also discourage false ac-
cusations. An accuser who uses her participation in the criminal
prosecution as a bargaining chip in settlement negotiations would
be liable for accepting a bribe13 or compounding a crime 131 for the
same reasons a defendant trying to affect the complainant's coop-
eration with prosecutors would be guilty of tampering. The false
accuser may thus not be able to settle until after the conclusion of
the criminal trial, when there is no threat of tampering liability,
and the complainant must expend her own resources to continue
litigation. After the criminal trial, the false accuser's bargaining
position is also weaker, as (presumably) the defendant will have
been found not guilty."
32
Scrutiny of pretrial settlements under tampering statutes
deters false accusations without hurting the interests of bona fide
complainants. In the past, courts have protected defendants
against false accusations by raising the substantive requirements
for a rape conviction.133 That approach protected rapists as well as
weaken her bargaining position. The prosecutor can thus reach a plea bargain that incor-
porates the full expected value of criminal sanctions. Second, a plea bargain employs
uniquely criminal punishments. The defendant must plead guilty to a crime, thereby ac-
knowledging guilt. As a convicted criminal, the defendant becomes an object of social
stigma. If the plea bargain includes a prison sentence, the defendant will be incapacitated
for some time.
'"This will partly protect the interest of victims in not testifying. Some defendants,
however, will not plea bargain, and in those cases some complainants will refuse to testify.
In this situation, prosecutors should continue to exercise their discretion, usually to drop
the charges. Deferring to the wishes of a witness that is adamant about not testifying al-
lows some rapists to escape justice. However, the proposal crafted in this Comment merely
addresses the harms of pretrial settlement. If, free of the influence of pretrial settlement,
the complainant cannot bring herself to testify, the law should not compound the rape
with further imposition.
'See note 51.
,3' See note 53.
"There is, of course, the possibility that an innocent man would be convicted of rape.
Given the exceedingly low conviction rate for rape, the likelihood that a wrongly accused
defendant would be convicted is very small. See Marsh, Geist and Caplan, Rape and the
Limits of Law Reform at 31 (cited in note 3) (citing studies that 4 or 5 percent of rape ar-
rests end in convictions). Judges and juries have historically been very skeptical of rape
accusations. Id at 91 (reporting a Michigan study finding that of prosecutors, police, de-
fense attorneys, and judges, judges were most likely to believe that complaints for rape
were fabricated more often than for other crimes). See also Battle v United States, 630 A2d
211, 217 (DC App 1993) (noting that the prosecution must overcome "an implied charge of
recent fabrication, which springs from some jurors' assumptions that sexual offense vic-
tims are generally lying"). A falsely accused defendant has an incentive to make a pretrial
settlement, because even if acquitted, he will suffer the stigma of trial. Nonetheless, dis-
couraging pretrial settlement, by reducing the number of false accusations, benefits poten-
tial victims of false accusations ex ante.
'"See Schulhofer, Unwanted Sex at 26-27 (cited in note 18). New York courts in the
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falsely accused defendants. The alternative proposed by this
Comment discourages accusations motivated by spite or greed
without protecting guilty defendants at trial.
Applying tampering statutes to pretrial settlement will also
benefit bona fide complainants by ensuring that more state re-
sources are allocated to prosecuting rape charges. The proposed
solution would reduce the number of complainants who decide
not to cooperate with the prosecution as a result of pretrial set-
tlement, leading prosecutors to have to drop fewer rape charges.
Since there will be fewer false complaints and defendants will be
unable to buy their way out of charges, police, prosecutors, and
courts will take complaints more seriously aid treat a complain-
ant's accusation with less suspicion and more respect. 13 Prosecu-
tors will have more confidence that a complainant will see the
case through to conviction, and they will have greater incentives
to investigate rape allegations. 135 Greater prosecutorial efforts to
investigate rapes will increase convictions.
136
Finally, society will be better educated about the scope of the
rape problem. Since fewer nonindigent defendants will be able to
buy their way out of a trial, the visibility of rape law enforcement
will increase. Trial and conviction of more nonindigent defen-
dants will also dispel the myth that the typical rapist is an indi-
gent stranger.137
1950s, 1960s, and 1970s strictly required that every material fact testified to by the com-
plainant be corroborated by independent evidence. Id. In a typical year in the early 1970s,
there were only eighteen rape convictions in New York. Id at 27.
' See Posner, Sex and Reason at 388 (cited in note 24) (arguing that suspicious judges
and police reduce the deterrence of rapists).
'Prosecutor are concerned about devoting resources to cases that they cannot suc-
cessfully complete. Consider Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Partici-
pation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 Harv L Rev 1849, 1892 (1996) (arguing that
prosecutors must be willing to mandate victim participation to prevent the waste of state
investigatory resources that occurs when victims renege on testifying and to ensure that
the state's response to domestic violence is not undermined). Some prosecutors subject
complainants to detailed interrogations to test the complainants ability to face cross-
examination at trial. Marsh, Geist and Caplan, Rape and the Limits of Law Reform at 89
(cited in note 3).
" Concededly, the proposed approach would operate only on the margin. Evidence
suggests that reform of substantive rape law has affected the arrest and conviction rates
of rapists only a small amount. Robert Bachman and Raymond Paternoster, A Contempo-
rary Look at the Effects of Rape Law Reform: How Far Have We Really Come?, 84 J Crim L
& Criminol 554, 556 (1993) (noting that many studies find "weak and inconsistent support
for the assumption that rape law reform has had a substantial impact on the criminal jus-
tice system's processing of rape cases"). However, "rape shield laws and modifications in
the consent standard have, in fact, increased the probability that victims of rape will re-
port their victimization to the police." Id at 565.
'"See note 31.
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B. Costs of the Proposed Approach
Admittedly, this proposal raises some concerns. Foremost is
the fact that judicial scrutiny of (at least nominally) civil settle-
ments interferes with the autonomy of the parties, preventing
them from disposing of their claims as they see fit. Parties to civil
litigation are generally free to settle any existing or potential
claims between them. However, all bribery laws interfere with
private agreements. After all, a bribe is merely a contract for the
exchange of money for services (favorable testimony). Bribes are
illegal, however, because of their public consequences: obstruction
and subversion of criminal and civil justice." Likewise, pretrial'
settlements, as private contracts, are presumptively legal. But
when an offer of pretrial settlement is intended to obstruct the
rape prosecution, the autonomy of the parties is superceded by
the interest of society in protecting the administration of justice,
as embodied in tampering statutes.3 9
Another consideration is the complainant's interest in re-
ceiving compensation from the defendant. A rape victim is likely
to have medical bills and attorney's fees. She may also suffer lost
wages from missed work. Although the proposed approach would
deter some pretrial settlement, it would largely protect the vic-
tim's interest in compensation. First, the proposal would not af-
fect settlement after the criminal trial. Rather than eliminating
settlement, the proposal would tend to postpone it until after the
criminal trial. Second, courts can award restitution to the com-
plainant as a criminal sanction.4 ' Restitution is an alternative to
civil settlement that can protect the interests of complainants,
particularly those who cannot afford the cost of pursuing civil
remedies on their own.1
4
'
'See text accompanying notes 61-63.
"Consider also the social benefits of applying tampering statutes to pretrial settle-
ments discussed in Part IV.A. As this Comment acknowledges, some rape victims may be
harmed by a disincentive for defendants to settle. However, if society is willing to make
interpersonal trade-offs of costs and benefits, then applying tampering statutes to pretrial
settlement should yield a social gain. Also, as noted above, although some rape victims
may be hurt ex post, potential rape victims may prefer ex ante the approach this Com-
ment advocates. See generally Lobsenz, 15 Crim L Bull at 313 (cited in note 16) ("To defer
to courtroom phobia is to endanger future victims of crimes solely in order to ease the
trauma of a present victim.").
'"All fifty states have already enacted some statutory restitution law, and at least
twenty-three states historically have mandated it by statute in criminal cases. Courts also
have inherent common law power to order restitution in criminal cases. See Linda F.
Frank, The Collection of Restitution: An Often Overlooked Service to Crime Victims, 8 St
John's J Legal Comment 107, 111-12 (1992).
.'See id at 112-13 (suggesting that criminal restitution remedies difficulties in ob-
taining civil recovery). If the court does not order restitution, however, postponing settle-
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Third, applying tampering statutes to pretrial settlement
may raise the costs of reporting rape, by creating a disincentive to
report for those victims who would prefer to make a pretrial set-
tlement. However, evidence from the domestic violence context
indicates that the chilling effect on reporting would be minimal.
Some district attorneys have adopted a policy of prosecuting do-
mestic violence cases regardless of the wishes of the complain-
ant.' In those jurisdictions there is no evidence of a chilling ef-
fect; in fact there is evidence that reporting of domestic violence
has increased.'
Finally, the application of tampering statutes to pretrial set-
tlements may incriminate not only corrupt defendants but unwit-
ting complainants who accept settlement offers. However, tam-
pering statutes, properly construed, apply to pretrial settlements
without exposing bona fide victims to liability for accepting
bribes. Initially, the language of those statutes prohibiting the
solicitation or acceptance of payments not to prosecute almost
always mirrors the language of statutes prohibiting the offering
or conferring of a payment. In some states, the liability for com-
pounding a crime is greater for one who receives the payment not
to prosecute than for the defendant who offers the payment.
However, specific intent-that is, intent to influence a witness or
victim, or intent to be influenced in exchange for the payment-is
required to establish a violation of tampering statutes in almost
every state.'" A complainant may have compelling reasons unre-
ment until after the criminal trial may leave some complainants with little relief A com-
plainant lacking the resources to threaten a civil trial credibly will be unable to extract a
settlement without the criminal prosecution as leverage. It is likely, however, that the
willingness of the plaintiffs' bar to accept cases on a contingency basis would alleviate this
problem.
"'Hanna, 109 Harv L Rev at 1853, 1862-63 (cited in note 135). It is worth noting that
such a "no-drop" rule in rape prosecutions would be an undesirable alternative to the pro-
posal set forth above. Such a rule would have the positive effect of reducing the incentive
to attempt to bribe a complainant to request that charges be dropped, but the possibility of
compelled participation in a traumatic trial might have the negative effect of harming vic-
tims and could antagonize the complainant-prosecutor relationship. For discussion of the
dilemmas posed by no-drop policies, see id at 1865-66.
31d at 1865 n 72, 1896-97.
"See, for example, Gill v State, 622 S2d 92, 93 (Fla App 1993) (construing Fla Stat
Ann § 914.22(1)(e) (witness tampering)). Some courts have held there is no requirement of
specific intent in cases involving threats and force. See, for example, State v Gray, 435 S2d
816, 820 (Fla 1983) (holding that Fla Stat Ann § 918.14(3)(a) (1979) does not require a
showing of scienter or specific intent because the legislature did not specifically include
those elements in the statute); Smith v State, 902 P2d 1271, 1281 (Wyo 1995) (finding Wyo
Stat Ann § 6-5-305(a) (1988), which proscribes "attempts to influence, intimidate or im-
pede" witnesses, does not require specific intent). However, most courts require specific in-
tent, even for tampering involving threats or force. See, for example, People v Lyons, 235
Cal App 3d 1456, 1 Cal Rptr 2d 763, 765 (1991) (construing Cal Penal Code § 136.1 (dis-
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lated to the offer of money not to seek prosecution; to the com-
plainant the settlement may be independent from the prosecu-
tion. Thus, it is perfectly consistent to find that the defendant in-
tended to influence the complainant and that the complainant did
not intend to be influenced, but rather was motivated by her own
desire to avoid trial."'
CONCLUSION
Pretrial settlements in rape prosecutions undermine the ef-
fective enforcement of rape law. Since the complainant is also al-
most always the primary witness in a rape trial, pretrial settle-
ment in rape cases is more likely to be used to influence the com-
plainant's cooperation in the prosecution than in other crimes.
Consequently, an interpretation of a bribery statute that fails to
reach pretrial settlements that (explicitly or implicitly) influence
the complainant not to cooperate with the rape prosecution will
fail to deter bribery.
Pretrial settlements, by their nature, are rarely subject to
judicial review; consequently, few courts have examined them for
violation of tampering statutes. When faced with such a case, a
court should closely scrutinize the pretrial settlement and allow
the finder of fact to infer intent to prevent a rape prosecution
from the circumstances of the case.
Interpreting tampering statutes to apply to pretrial settle-
ments, at least in the context of rape prosecutions, is consistent
with the text and purpose of tampering statutes and will alleviate
some of the harms of pretrial settlement. Such an interpretation
recognizes the potential use of pretrial settlement to influence
complainants to seek an end to prosecutions; it deters such forms
of corruption and thereby protects enforcement of rape law.
suading witness from testifying) to require a showing of specific intent); State v Hall, 441
S2d 429, 431 (La App 1983) (construing La Rev Stat Ann § 14:122 (public intimidation) to
require a showing of specific intent).
'"'Recall that a bilateral agreement is generally not required to find violation of a
tampering statute. See notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
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